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Abstract
The article aims to provide a critical overview of the arguments used in the debate about policies to promote downstream processing of
minerals, particularly coercive policies such as export taxes or bans. It reviews someof the possible reasonswhydownstreamprocessing
ofminerals does not always takeplace in the countrywhere they aremined, including asymmetryofmarket power, tariff escalation, scale
factors, availability of inputs, closeness tomarket, and business environment. The costs (in terms of lost exports of unprocessed exports)
andbenefits (in terms of increased processing) of coercive further processing policies are discussed, using as an example Indonesia’s ban
on exports of unprocessed minerals from 2014 to 2016. It is concluded that there are few if any examples of successful use of taxes or
restrictionsonunprocessedproducts topromotedownstreamprocessing.Existingevidenceappears to showthat theseverityandduration
of the downturn in exports of unprocessed products surprised governments and that fewgovernments even attempt to estimate either the
negative or the positive impacts in any systematic manner. It would probably be more productive in most cases to instead emphasize
industrial policies that focus on removing constraints and bottlenecks that stand in the way of the economy reaching its full potential,
including those relating to skills, credit, energy supply, transport infrastructure, and inappropriate regulation.
Keywords Downstreamprocessing .Export constraints .Export taxes . Industrialpolicy .Mineralprocessing .Mining .Resource
nationalism
Why is it important to think
about downstream processing now?
The economic policy debate about downstream processing
has a long history, usually colored in mercantilist or central
planning hues, with the most prominent examples being found
in the old Soviet Union. It would have been easy to believe
that this discussion had been laid to rest with the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and the discredit of central planning and with
the disappointing results of industrial policy as pursued in the
1970s and 1980s, not just in developing but also in developed
countries. For anybody who doubted, recent history could
have been expected to provide sufficient empirical evidence
for even the most skeptical. For the past 30 years, world trade
has grown faster than ever, resulting in a dramatic reduction in
poverty, in large part due to specialization and the fragmenta-
tion of supply chains, as demonstrated by the fact that world
trade has grown much faster than world GDP, contradicting
the arguments of those who believe in the benefits of policies
aimed to promote vertical integration within one country.
However, more recent thinking about industrial policy ad-
vocates a more nuanced approach, focusing on the role of
transaction costs and in particular on the institutions that re-
duce transaction costs. As expressed by Dietsche (2017, p. 5):
The general case for industrial policy is built on the argu-
ment that there are situations in which markets rely on the
public sector to achieve broadly desirable economic and
social outcomes. These situations are, but are not limited
to, those cases where clear ‘market failures’ can be identi-
fied. Therefore, industrial policy sits at the heart of the
relationship between markets and states, and it also shapes
economies and the social outcomes they produce.
It could be argued that government efforts to reduce trans-
action costs could result in improved conditions for
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downstream processing. Such efforts could be seen as ele-
ments of industrial policy, which, after all, comes in a large
variety of flavours (see Smart 2017).
Several governments seem to think that vertical integration
will yield better results in terms of resource-based develop-
ment than earlier approaches:
Achieving the transformative potential of Africa’s re-
sources requires a new way of thinking about minerals,
which aligns with the continent’s own priorities of
industrialisation and diversification through value-addi-
tion, processing, beneficiation and the creation of strong
mineral-led linkages with other sectors of our econo-
mies (Fatima Haram Acyl, African Union Trade and
Industry Commissioner, Indaba 2017).
Policies in a growing number of countries confirm the interest
in downstream processing. Some countries have used positive
fiscal incentives. Indonesia, for instance, relies on tax holidays,
reductions in corporate income tax and duty exempt imports to
incentivize primary mineral producers to invest in processing
facilities (Bellefleur 2014). Rwanda applies a 15% Preferential
Corporate Income tax for projects exporting processed minerals
up to 50% of turnover ofminerals produced in Rwanda (Rwanda
Development Board n.d.). Generally, businesses in Rwanda pay
tax at the rate of 30%. Other countries, including India (iron ore)
and Zambia (copper), have introduced export taxes on unpro-
cessed commodities. Finally, some countries have resorted to
outright bans on the export of unprocessed commodities, includ-
ing Indonesia on bauxite, copper, nickel and tin from 2014 to the
end of 2016 and Tanzania on copper and gold since March 2017
(Östensson and Löf 2017).
All of these developments justify a closer look at policies
aiming to support or promote downstream processing of min-
erals, particularly through restrictions on exports, and to try to
assess the possibilities of success of these policies. These pos-
sibilities may depend partly on the degree to which the poli-
cies form part of a coherent industrial policy framework or
whether they represent attempts by populist politicians to mo-
bilize the electorate or reward particular constituencies under
the heading of Bresource nationalism.^
The term resource nationalism does not have an agreed
definition. Its meaning may range from a broad and uncontro-
versial Bdesire of the people of resource-rich countries to de-
rive more economic benefit from their natural resources and
the resolution of their governments to concomitantly exercise
greater control over the country’s natural resource sectors^
(Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 2012),
to a narrower Banti-competitive behaviour designed to restrict
the international supply of a natural resource^ (HM
Government Horizon Scanning Programme 2014).
At this point, it is worthwhile recalling that actions to pro-
mote downstream processing through restrictions on exports
may be incompatible with countries’ commitments under
WTO rules.1 Most export taxes or bans are not challenged in
the WTO because no other country than the one imposing the
measures suffers any significant damage. However, in many
cases, taxes can also be challenged under bilateral trade deals
or investment treaties, for instance, the EU Economic
Partnership Agreements. Thus, Article 15 of the Interim
Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic
Partnership Agreement between the Eastern and Southern
Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community
and its Member States, on the other part, reads BExcept as
otherwise provided in Annex III and for the duration of this
Agreement, the Parties shall not institute any new duties or
taxes on or in connection with the exportation of goods to the
other Party in excess of those imposed on like products des-
tined for internal sale^ (European Union 2012).
The surrounding rhetoric sometimes sounds like resource
nationalism aimed at domestic audiences and the objectives
and underlying analysis are not always clear and explicit.
However, one can imagine several mainstream arguments
for making further processing an industrial policy objective:
& Prices of more processed products may be more stable and
further processing would therefore provide some insur-
ance against revenue variations;
& Processing raw materials may give rise to important learn-
ing effects and improve skills;
& The processed products may be strategic or, at least, less
expensive, inputs for domestic manufacturing, construc-
tion, or agriculture.
The present article aims to provide a critical overview of
the arguments used in the debate about policies to promote
downstream processing of minerals, particularly coercive pol-
icies such as export taxes or bans. The BMarket failure, policy
failure or comparative advantage?^ section in the following
reviews some of the reasons why downstream processing of
minerals does not always take place in the country where they
are mined. The BCosts and benefits of downstream processing
policies^ section discusses costs and benefits of coercive pol-
icies, drawing partly on the example of Indonesia’s ban on
exports of unprocessed minerals from 2014 to 2016. The
1 For instance, in 2009, export duties on bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium,
manganese, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc, and export restrictions
on some of them, imposed by China were challenged by the EU and the USA,
later joined by Mexico. China argued in its defense that some of its export
duties and quotas were justified because they related to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources for some of the raw materials (Article XX(g) of
GATT 1994). But China was not able to demonstrate that it imposed these
restrictions in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption of the raw materials. A dispute panel found for the complainants
and in January 2013 China notified that it had abolished the duties (World
Trade Organization n.d.-a).
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BConclusions^ section, finally, attempts to draw some very
general conclusions.
Market failure, policy failure, or comparative
advantage?
Underlying much of the rhetoric surrounding the downstream
processing debate is the idea that downstream processing
should happen by itself and that its absence reflects one or
more market or policy failures. In the case of minerals, down-
stream processing from the ore or concentrate stage usually
involves weight reduction—by two-thirds for copper and by
three-quarters for bauxite/aluminum, less for most other
minerals—so lower freight costs should in principle be a pow-
erful incentive for further processing. The fact that it still does
not happen in many cases is interpreted by some to mean that
the playing field is not level. It is important to note that, unlike
the situation for manufactured products, branding, market seg-
mentation, links to services or quality differences all play a
minimal role in minerals and metals markets. Accordingly, the
features most commonly underlying market failures are ab-
sent. It is almost never a question of processed products from
mining countries not being competitive on the world market
but rather of how to achieve sufficient profitability of the
downstream stages.
Therefore, the reasons why downstream integration is not a
feasible or favorable strategy for many enterprises may have
to do mainly with comparative advantage. The difference is
crucial, because while market failures can be corrected, at least
in theory, doing something about comparative advantage is
more difficult and takes longer time.
The market failure explanation of the lack of downstream
integration rests on an assumed asymmetry of market power,
where later stages of the supply chain are able to impose prices
and other conditions on the earlier stages.2 However, in actual
fact, processing margins are often thin and very variable,
which in these cases implies that processors are price takers
rather than monopsonists. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the cases
of copper and iron ore/rebars respectively.
Figure 1 shows that the TC (Treatment Charge, the
smelter’s fee for converting copper concentrate to blister
copper) and the RC (Refining Charge, the fee for refining
blister copper to copper cathodes) have generally been a small
portion of the price for refined copper cathodes and, maybe
more important, the sum of the fees has fluctuated widely,
sometimes being close to zero. Figure 2 shows that the situa-
tion has been similar with respect to the relationship between
iron ore and rebars (also called reinforcing rods, the most basic
form of steel).
There are almost certainly exceptions where margins are
not as thin, although none comes readily to mind, but they are
likely to reflect transitory situations of uneven market power.
If indeed there is a significant rent element in the processing
margin, then in theory, this can be captured by a minimum
export price regime. This however requires considerable flex-
ibility and sophistication on the part of government.
Alternatively, a large processing margin in individual cases
may simply reflect transfer mispricing of the unprocessed
product, in which case strengthened capacity to deal with
mispricing is the answer, not increased processing capacity.
Tariff escalation is often put forward as an explanation for
the limited extent of downstream processing of minerals.
Table 1 shows ranges of import tariffs for a number of proc-
essed mineral products in important importing countries
(China, European Union, India, Japan, USA). Bound tariffs
on iron ore, copper ores, and concentrates and bauxite (alu-
minium ores and concentrates) are 0, except in India, where
tariffs on all three are 2.5%. Tariff escalation may appear sig-
nificant, particularly since bound tariffs constitute a high por-
tion of the value added at some processing stages.
However, regional and bilateral trade agreements have re-
duced applied tariffs, often to zero. ACP (African, Caribbean
and Pacific) countries have free access to EU markets; AGOA
(the African Growth Opportunities Act) provides the same for
African countries for the US market. Accordingly, trade nego-
tiations rather than export restrictions would appear to be ap-
propriate where tariff escalation is a problem.
There are a number of other reasons that affect comparative
and competitive advantage and which may act as obstacles to
downstream processing:
Scale factors Many industrial processes require large scale
to be commercially viable. If the available production of
raw minerals is not sufficiently large, downstream process-
ing is not economically feasible. For instance, a copper
smelter needs access to about 150,000 tons of copper con-
centrate or more per year to be commercially viable. New
crude steel plants using blast furnaces generally have a
capacity of at least 2 million tons per year. Electric arc
furnaces can be much smaller, but require inputs in the
form of scrap or Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) that have to
be available in sufficient quantities. A new alumina plant is
not economic unless it produces at least 1 million tons per
year. Moreover, developing countries seldom have
2 According to the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis, named after Hans Singer
(1950) and Raúl Prebisch (1950), in a world system in which poorer nations
specialize in primary products, such as raw minerals and agricultural products
that are then shipped to industrialized nations that, in turn, make advanced
products to be sold to poorer nations, the major benefits of international trade
will go to the wealthy nations. The reason for this state of affairs is said to be
that primary commodity markets are competitive and so reductions in costs are
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Producers of many
manufactured products, it is argued, enjoy a better position because they have
some market power. This allows them to share the benefits of falling costs
between workers in the form of better salaries and shareholders in the form of
greater dividends.
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domestic markets large enough to absorb a significant part
of the mine output and thus provide a platform from which
outward expansion can take place, and even if they did,
production of the unprocessed mineral would often still
be too large to be processed and used within the
country—if Zambia had the same industry structure as
South Korea and therefore, the same copper use per capita
(at 15.6 kg the highest in the world in in 2012, according to
the International Copper Study Group (2013)), measured at
the stage of semi-manufactured products, it would still use
less than 30% of its copper output.
Availability of inputs Important inputs have to be available at a
competitive price. It is difficult for aluminum smelters to be
competitive without low cost electricity. A legal requirement
to process copper concentrate in the Democratic Republic of
Congo was delayed after copper producers demonstrated that
there was not enough electric power available to smelt and
refine the copper mined in the country (CreamerMedia 2016).
Closeness to market Small inventories and tight delivery
margins have reinforced the importance of being able to
deliver quickly. It takes 20 days at 13 knots from Durban
to Guangzhou (Sea-distances.org n.d.): sometimes that is
not fast enough for modern manufacturing. Moreover, de-
livering products with the right specifications on a timely
basis to the manufacturing industry requires close contact
with customers.
Business environment The overall business environment is
obviously of importance. Mines have to be located where
there are mineral deposits, but location choices for process-
ing capacity can be made more freely. While the quality of
a deposit may compensate for an unattractive (from the
investor’s point of view) investment regime, this is not
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the case for processing capacity. In addition to political risk
considerations, factors such as availability of skilled labor,
logistics, and financial services affect investment deci-
sions. This factor is the one that, in principle, governments
can influence most easily.
Costs and benefits of downstream processing
policies
Policies intended to promote downstream processing of min-
erals have both costs and benefits. The objective is of course to
devise policies such that the costs are more than offset by the
benefits.
Costs
The most important cost of coercive downstream processing
policies consists of missed production because production that
otherwise would be viable and take place does not happen:
& Mineral deposits that are too small to justify investment in
processing or too difficult to process domestically for min-
eralogical reasons remain undeveloped;
& Projects are not developed because of the additional risk
associated with downstream processing;
& Mine production is constrained because of insufficient do-
mestic processing capacity;
Figure 3 shows the development of unprocessed and proc-
essed mineral exports in Indonesia. An export ban on unpro-
cessed minerals entered into force January 2014, combined
with export taxes on certain minerals. The policy was primar-
ily justified in nationalist terms and was described as a way of
achieving Beconomic sovereignty.^ Without policies like the
export ban, so the argument went, Indonesia would just con-
tinue selling cheap commodities to rich industrialized nations
without ever moving up the global value chain (Inside
Indonesia 2017).
The 2009 Mining Law laid the legal foundation for the
2014 export ban. Articles 102 and 103 of the law mandate
that companies must add value to mineral ores prior to export.
Article 170 stipulated that companies with contracts of work
or mining licenses had 5 years from the law’s enactment in
Table 1 Range of import tariffs,
selected metals and countries, per
cent
Iron and steel (HS72) Copper (HS74) Aluminum (HS76)
China 1–10 0–15 0–10
India 5–10 5–10 2.5–7.5
European Union 0–2.2 0–5.2 0–8.8
Japan 0–2 0–3 0–7.5
USA 0 0–3 1.3–5.7
Source: World Trade Organization (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds433_e.htm)
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which to prepare processing facilities. However, in the years
following the law’s enactment both foreign and domestic
companies failed to invest in mineral smelters, not believing
the government would introduce a hard ban and sacrifice ex-
port revenues. This meant that by 2014, Indonesia still had
little refining or smelting capacity for key minerals like nickel,
bauxite, or copper. Most mining companies assumed the gov-
ernment would re-think the intervention and retreat from the
nationalist position.
The ban was followed by a severe downturn in mineral
exports. This downturn was not offset by an increase in proc-
essed exports, partly because it took several years to build new
processing facilities. In fact, two alumina refineries have been
built. One was completed in June 2016 and produces metal-
lurgical alumina, that is, alumina used in aluminum smelters
(Aluminum Insider 2018). The other, which started produc-
tion in 2015, produces chemical grade alumina (Reuters
2015). Both refineries export most of their production.
However, their total bauxite use is about 5 million tonnes
per year, whereas in 2013, the last year before the export
ban entered into force, bauxite exports were 57million tonnes.
Nickel mines have changed their output in order to comply
with the ban. They now export nickel pig iron (classified as
ferronickel in trade statistics) instead of nickel concentrates.
The upgrading is relatively simple and the price is only mar-
ginally higher. The total value of nickel exports in all forms
was still considerably lower in 2017 than it was in 2013 (US$
2116 million, compared to US$ 2839 million). Little has hap-
pened to copper production and exports since the largest pro-
ducer, Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold, was allowed to
postpone any investment in processing capacity.
It is not surprising that efforts to promote the domestic
processing of minerals through the use of export taxes or bans
result in reduced exports of unprocessed minerals—that is,
after all, the objective of the policy. The Indonesian example
shows that the reduction in unprocessed exports can be large
enough to have macroeconomic consequences and that the
conversion to processed exports is at worst not possible and
at best expensive and time consuming.
In order to achieve the objectives of downstream process-
ing policies, it is not enough to impose export taxes or bans—
producers usually have to be given positive incentives to in-
vest in processing capacity. In Indonesia, the possible incen-
tives included (Bellefleur 2014):
& 0% import duty on imports of capital goods
& 0% import duty on imports of goods and materials re-
quired for processing
& An Investment Tax Allowance in the form of a taxable
income reduction of as much as 30% of the realized in-
vestment, spread over 6 years
& An exemption from corporate income tax for 5 to 10 years
beginning from the date commercial production
commences (corporate income tax measures apply only
to investments over US$ 100 million)
& A 2-year 50% reduction in corporate income tax liability
after the end of the tax holiday period
& An extension of the exemption or reduction in corporate
income tax depending on the competitiveness and strate-
gic value of the industry
The prospect of generous tax incentives spurred the interest
of many investors, particularly from China. Although few
projects materialized, the cost was still considerable, mainly
because the tax revenues that the government had previously
collected from exporting mining companies disappeared. The
cost in terms of lower tax revenues may have been behind the
decision in early 2016 to end the export restrictions as of the
beginning of 2017 (Mining.com 2016).
But according to some observers, a second theory is possi-
ble (Inside Indonesia 2017). Prior to the ban, state-owned
company PT Aneka Tambang (Antam) exported the largest
proportion of Indonesia’s nickel concentrates. This meant that
Antam suffered huge financial losses when the nickel ban was
introduced. In 2014, the consensus among policy makers was
that Antam would have to suffer immediate financial pain in
order to eventually become a driver of value-added economic
growth. Unable to export, and with no domestic smelter to sell
to, Antam’s profits fell precipitously. In 2015, the government
poured about half a billion US dollars into Antam in order to
boost the company’s output and help it invest in several down-
stream projects. It has been suggested that the government’s
decision to relax the ban was more about fixing Antam’s bot-
tom line than about fixing broader budget troubles. Indeed, in
the lead up to the January 2017 smelter deadline, there were
rumors that the ban would be relaxed for Antam only and not
for Indonesia’s hundreds of smaller domestic nickel exporters.
When the relaxation was announced, Antam’s shares jumped
6%.
Additional costs may be associated with trade measures. In
order to protect the new processing industry from import com-
petition, various kinds of trade measures are usually intro-
duced, which result in higher input costs for domestic
manufacturing. Moreover, once a processing plant has been
built, it has to be kept operating at capacity, even if mine
production declines. The result is excess capacity, squeezed
margins and, usually, need for state financial support.
Benefits
One of the most frequently cited benefits of downstream pro-
cessing is an increase in value added. Increased value added is
often presented as a self-evident argument in favor of mea-
sures to promote further processing. The underlying reasoning
is not clear. While value is always added in the simple arith-
metic sense that the price of the processed product is
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(normally) higher than that of the unprocessed one, it is of
course possible for the value added through processing to be
negative, for instance, if the processing costs exceed the in-
crease in price. This is possible particularly in situations where
mining companies have been obliged by legislation to carry
out processing.
Increased export revenue is another potential benefit,
which may be important if the economy of the host country
is facing balance of payments constraints. This may, however,
be offset by reduced export revenues from unprocessed min-
erals, if export restrictions are at the heart of the policies pur-
sued, as in the Indonesian case.
It is sometimes argued that downstream processing will
result in higher fiscal revenue. However, if a company has to
be forced to undertake an investment, this implies that the
investment is not a very profitable one. Accordingly, obliging
it to invest is unlikely to result in significant additional fiscal
income.3 Other tax revenues such as income tax paid by em-
ployees and VAT are also likely to yield only insignificant
amounts since downstream processing of minerals is almost
always capital intensive, which means that wages are a small
portion of the value added, and since VAT is normally reim-
bursed to exporters—and the bulk of the processed production
is likely to be exported. Again, if the policy results in reduced
exports of unprocessed minerals, all the different kinds of
fiscal revenues fromminingwill fall, often bymuchmore than
the tax revenues generated by increased processing.
If on the other hand there are monopoly rents in processing,
it would be reasonable for the government to use fiscal policy
to try to correct the situation in order both to raise economic
efficiency and also to increase government income from the
extractive sector. As seen from the discussion of processing
margins, the existence of large monopoly rents in mineral
processing is however far from certain.
Prospects of increased employment have also been cited
to support the argument for downstream processing.
However, as already argued, downstream processing is
usually very capital intensive so any addition to employ-
ment is modest, unless, of course, the processed product is
an important input into labor intensive activities, which
might become more competitive as a result of improved
availability of the processed product. This is a possible
long-term advantage, but the loss of employment in the
short and medium term from constraining exports of un-
processed products will often be considerably larger.
Moreover, while some jobs in mineral processing are gen-
eral in scope and may entail portable skills, some are not
and many of the skills cannot be used in other industries.
Industrial diversification, aiming to increase the resiliency
of the economy to shocks as well as its long term growth
potential, is another often cited argument for downstream pro-
cessing. Incentives to create and support downstream indus-
tries could be justified if they made the economy, including
exports, more diverse and therefore more resistant to adverse
events. Moreover, increased diversification may lead to a
denser network of inter-industry links, thereby creating addi-
tional opportunities for growth. The skills used in downstream
industries may allow incomes to rise and stimulate the econ-
omy, particularly at the local/regional level—but this is exact-
ly what mining does in any case. Nevertheless, if skills are
indeed portable, learning effects may be significant and may
extend beyond the mining sector.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it should first be noted that there are few if any
examples of successful use of taxes or restrictions on unpro-
cessed products to promote downstream processing.4 Existing
empirical evidence such as the Indonesian experience or the
experience of export taxes on iron ore in India5 shows that the
initiatives that have been taken do not appear to be based on a
careful assessment of costs and benefits. In particular, the
severity and duration of the downturn in exports of unpro-
cessed products appear to have surprised governments in both
countries. In other countries, where outright export bans have
not been used and where export taxes have been smaller as a
portion of the sales price, the consequences have been less
severe and less directly observable. This is the case in partic-
ular, where closures of capacity have been avoided, the con-
sequences mainly take the form of lost potential production,
which is less obviously attributable to the policy.
A successful policy would have to at least offset the nega-
tive impact on national income, employment, and tax revenue
from reduced mining activity with positive impacts from in-
creased processing. However, it seems that few governments
even attempt to estimate either the negative or the positive
impacts in any systematic manner.
3 The investment could for instance show a book profit but might not achieve
the hurdle rate of return applied by the company, which in principle means that
the company has other better investment opportunities. In any case, this im-
plies that profits are relatively low, as would be expected tax revenues.
4 It could be argued that China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth metals
constitutes a successful example. However, China did lose a dispute in the
WTO over its export restrictions (World Trade Organization, DS433) and, as
pointed out by Humphreys (2017), the restrictions did not in any case impose
any economic cost since the quotas imposed by China were not used up by
western buyers.
5 The Indian steel industry uses mainly lump iron ore and high grade fines. In
order to assure the steel industry of secure raw materials supply, a 5% export
tax on iron ore lumps and fines was introduced in 2009 and raised in stages to
30% in 2011. Royalties on iron ore were raised from 10 to 15% in 2014. As a
result, from being the world’s third largest iron ore exporter in 2011, India
became a net importer of iron ore in 2014. Although exports have recovered
somewhat since then, they are still dramatically lower than they were before
the taxes were introduced (Östensson and Löf 2017).
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It is probably reasonable to point out that the presence of
raw material resources constitutes only one of the factors that
need to be taken into account when taking a decision on the
location of a particular type of plant. Incentives or directives to
promote downstream processing thus represent only one var-
iation on the familiar theme of picking winners—and one
based on a particularly narrow set of criteria. It would proba-
bly be more productive in most cases to instead emphasize
industrial policies that focus on removing constraints and bot-
tlenecks that stand in the way of the economy reaching its full
potential, including those relating to skills, credit, energy sup-
ply, transport infrastructure, and inappropriate regulation.
Where foreign processors are suspected of exploiting superior
market power or practicing transfer mispricing, strengthened
regulation is the answer, rather than forced vertical integration.
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